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1     Introduction 
 
The mutual fund industry in the USA and UK has increased dramatically over the last 30 
years.  In the US and UK about 70% of institutional funds are actively managed and this 
rises to over 90% for retail funds.  Hedge fund assets grew rapidly after 2000 and by 2006 
US hedge fund assets amounted to around $800bn to $1 trillion – about 10% of mutual fund 
assets.  On fund performance, the first key issue is whether active funds have an (ex-post) 
abnormal fund performance in terms of net returns to investors which is positive.1  A 
second major issue is whether abnormal fund performance can be identified ex-ante and for 
how long it persists in the future.   
To an economist, one’s view of how the world works is probably a mixture of the 
elegance of particular theories, their empirical content and some good old fashioned “gut 
feeling” – a more polite term here might be “studied introspection”.   In this paper we want 
to apply this “holy trinity” as a basis for assessing the performance of investment funds.  
The paper is a highly selective and perhaps idiosyncratic view of the literature and we do 
not claim that the paper constitutes an exhaustive survey.2
The rest of this article is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we discuss some broad 
issues in economic modelling and statistical inference, in Section 3 we discuss the 
performance of mutual funds and this is followed in Section 4 by a discussion of hedge fund 
performance.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2     Economic Models and Statistical Inference 
 
Let us start by noting some of the broad theoretical and statistical ideas that have influenced 
our views in this area.  From textbook portfolio theory we have the elegant baseline mean-
variance model but we do notice that as soon as we extend this to the “standard” 
intertemporal framework ( perhaps the holy grail of economic modelling) we come across 
some major problems.  These models are difficult to solve and invariably involve complex 
 
1 Taxes on capital gains and dividend disbursements also influence the return to investors, although lack of 
data on individuals’ tax liabilities makes any adjustments difficult - so most studies use pre-tax returns. 
2 For a recent survey on theoretical issues on performance see Lehmann and Timmermann (2008) and on 
empirical evidence for mutual funds see Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan (2006). 
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numerical solutions which make it difficult to believe that investors behave “as if” they use 
such models in asset allocation.  However, intertemporal models do introduce the notion 
that hedging demands are potentially important - this depends on correlations between asset 
returns and “other variables” such as labour income (Viceira, 2001).  As we might expect 
such models suggest that the demand for risky assets depends on the time horizon to 
retirement but results are very sensitive to slight changes in inputs.  For example, if there is 
thought to be predictability in asset returns, the shift into risky assets predicted by such 
models is implausibly large (Campbell and Viceira, 1999).  However, if we introduce 
parameter uncertainty then such effects are attenuated (Barberis, 2000).  These models 
should form the basis for “default funds” for long term savings vehicles such as 401K (in 
the US) and the proposed “Brit Saver” schemes which will shortly be implemented in the 
UK (OECD, 2003, and Turner, 2006).  However, it must be said that actual behaviour 
seems far removed from such optimal models as investors appear to use simple heuristics 
such as the 1/n rule when allocating amongst their risky assets (Bernartazi and Thaler, 2001)  
and can be encouraged to save more by simple pre-commitment rules (e.g. automatically 
increase savings when earnings increase).  As far as mutual funds and hedge funds are 
concerned it is frequently the case that advocates of “picking winners” and adding such 
funds to an existing portfolio, base their advice on static mean-variance optimization - and 
charge high fees for doing so. Theory tells us this may not always be appropriate. 
Conceptual difficulties with expected utility maximisation as a basis for 
‘microfoundations’ in financial markets (see for example, Rabin, 2000), has led to 
alternatives where utility depends on changes in wealth (anchoring), where losses are much 
more ‘painful’ than gains (e.g. loss-aversion or disappointment aversion) and where 
individual’s consider gains and losses in isolation (i.e. “narrow framing” ). These changes 
have been important in understanding and explaining the equity premium puzzle and in 
extending factor models to explain investment fund returns.   
When we turn to “empirical facts” that stand out, one is the success of the Fama-French 
3 factor model in pricing assets and the accompanying empirical evidence that these may 
mimic genuine risk factors.  Such a simple model does not do everything of course. It fails 
to price momentum portfolios (including those of mutual funds) and for that we need to add 
the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (Lesmond, Schill and Zhou, 2004). 
 
 
 
QASS, Vol. 2 (2), 2008, 45-62
© qass.org.uk
2.1     Can You Count? 
 
The next statistical issue to consider is how to interpret results which count the number of 
“winner funds”. The standard approach to determining whether the performance of a single 
fund  (or a single portfolio such as the average fund) demonstrates skill or luck is to choose 
a rejection region and associated significance level γ  and to reject the null of “no 
outperformance” if the test statistic lies in the rejection region - ‘luck’ is interpreted as the 
significance level chosen.  However, using γ = 5% when testing the alphas for each of m-
funds, the probability of finding at least one lucky fund from a sample of m-funds is much 
higher than 5% (even if all funds have true alphas of zero).3   
To see how simply counting the number of “significant” outcomes can mislead investors 
about the true “success” of particular strategy consider the results of Sullivan, Timmermann 
and White (2001) who note the vast number of studies that find calendar effects in stock 
returns and address the problem of whether this is due to ‘chance’ (data mining).  They use 
over 100 years of daily returns data (on the S&P 500 and its futures index) to examine a 
huge set of up to 9500, possible calendar rules.  Once the effects of undertaking a large 
number of tests has been accounted for they find that the best calendar rule does not yield a 
statistically significant (‘reality check’) p-value for ‘predictability’, where the latter is taken 
to be either the mean return or the Sharpe ratio. 
In testing performance across many funds a balanced approach is needed.  The false 
discovery rate (FDR) measures the proportion of lucky funds among a group of funds, 
which have been found to have significant (individual) alphas and hence the FDR 
‘measures’ luck among the pool of ‘significant funds’ (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1999, 
Storey, 2002, and Storey, Taylor and Siegmund, 2004). Hence, (1-FDR) measures the 
proportion of “truly significant” funds - this is clearly useful information for investors.4  So, 
                                                 
3 This probability is the compound type-I error.  For example, if the m tests are independent then  Pr(at least 1 
false discovery) = 1 – (1- γ )m  = zm , which for a relatively low value m=50 funds and conventional γ =0.05 
gives zm = 0.92 – a high probability of observing at least one false discovery. 
 
4 We use the usual language and terminology found in the statistical literature on false discoveries and error 
rates.  The use of “truly significant” (sometimes “genuine” is used)  should not be taken to mean that we are 
100% certain that the  proportion of funds among a  particular group of significant funds have non-zero alphas 
– the FDR even if it is found to be zero, is still subject to estimation error.   Also note that the FDR says 
nothing about the statistical significance of the alpha of any particular individual fund  -  conceptually, the 
FDR only applies to a group of significant funds. The FDR approach seems to have been first used in testing 
the difference between genes in particular cancer cells. 
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informed investors when forming portfolios need to know both the size of the significant 
alphas of individual funds and also the FDR amongst these alphas - we discuss this further 
below. 
 
2.2     Masters of the Universe 
 
We are used to seeing “press reports” which give impressive figures for the alpha of say the 
best fund of say 20% per annum (p.a.), which is statistically significant at the 1% level or 
better. If we are not careful this can be misleading for investors since the distribution of the 
return of the best fund is very different from the population itself and the standard critical 
values do not apply.  This idea also has implications for survivorship bias since in some 
databases (particularly for hedge funds or private equity) we only observe the “best funds” - 
that is, those that have survived and hence this inflates the observed outcomes for 
performance. 
A key empirical fact is that we require a considerable amount of data to obtain 
reasonable power for our test on alpha.  For example, suppose alpha = 1.8% p.a. (0.15% per 
month (p.m.)) in the market model, R-squared = 0.9, beta = 1 and residual standard 
deviation is 1.5% p.m.5 Then even with T = 270 months (>22 years) of data, power (for a 
one sided test) is only 50%, whereas if alpha is as large as 3.6% p.a., power equal to 50% is 
achieved with T= 68 (5.7 years) of data - see Lehmann and Timmermann (2008).  
Empirically this suggests that it is only in the tails of the cross-section of the performance 
distribution that we might have reasonably high power in detecting outperformance.  
 
3     Performance: Factor Models 
 
Risk adjusted mutual fund performance is usually measured using the alpha from factor 
models -  a positive alpha implies that an investor can combine this fund with the “market 
portfolio” to obtain a Sharpe ratio higher than that which can be obtained using the 
benchmarks alone. 6 Unconditional models have factor loadings that are assumed to be time 
 
5 For convenience, we assume a benchmark Sharpe ratio of zero, but this does not affect the general point 
made. 
6 Semi-parametric “characteristic based measures” (Daniel et al., 1997), using stock holdings and stock trades 
are also used to measure performance - but results are broadly similar to those using factor models, so we do 
not report these in this paper (see Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan, 2006).  
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invariant.  Carhart’s (1997) four-factor (4F) performance measure is the alpha estimate 
from:  
 50
,   , 1 , 2 3 4i t i i m t i t i t i t i tr r SMB HML MOMα β β β β= + + + + +ε , 
 
where  is the excess return on the market portfolio, ,  and ,m tr tSMB tHML tMOM  are zero 
investment factor mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market value and momentum 
effects, respectively.  If 4 0iβ =  the model is the Fama-French (1992, 1993) three-factor 
model while Jensen’s (1968) alpha is the intercept from the CAPM one-factor (or market) 
model. Conditional models (Ferson and Schadt, 1996, Christopherson, Ferson and 
Glassman, 1998) allow for the possibility that a fund’s factor betas and alpha may depend 
on lagged public information variables.7 In what follows,  ‘statistically significant’ refers to 
a 5% significance level (or better).  
 
3.1     Average Performance 
 
Most recent studies of mutual fund performance do not suffer from acute survivorship bias 
because databases at least for the US and UK have alive and dead funds.  On average, US 
funds (over January 1975-December 2002 using around 1,700 mutual funds) have a net 
return alpha of about minus 0.5% p.a. (Kosowski et al., 2006). But it is also found that some 
subgroups of funds do seem to outperform their benchmarks (e.g. US growth oriented 
funds, Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers, 2000, and Wermers, 2000).  Much less empirical 
work on performance has been done on UK funds but the evidence suggests that the average 
fund over 1975-95 underperforms its benchmarks by around 1% p.a. (Leger, 1997, Quigley 
and Sinquefield, 2000, and Fletcher, 1997).  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
7 Space constraints precludes discussion of market timing but the evidence  seems to be quite conclusive that 
market timing is unlikely to provide profitable strategies after transactions costs and on a net return, risk 
adjusted basis (see inter alia Treynor and Mazuy, 1966, Henriksson and Merton, 1981, Jiang, Yao and Yu 
2007, and Bollen and Busse, 2001). 
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3.2     Individual Funds 
 
Kosowski et al. (2006) explicitly deal with the problem of inference when funds have been 
ordered according to their ex-post performance. They derive empirically (rather than 
analytically) the distribution of order statistics under the null of no outperformance.  
Compared to using standard critical values they find far fewer winner funds. However, 
funds ranked above the top 5th percentile (i.e. a maximum of about 90 funds) are statistically 
significant with 4
net
Fα   in excess of 4.8% p.a. These “skilled” funds are all found to be in 
either the aggressive growth or growth styles.8  Using a similar bootstrap approach on UK 
data (842 funds, 1975-2002), Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan (2008) find that only 12 
funds out of the top 20 are statistically significant (each at 10% significance level).  For the 
UK, in contrast to the US results, skill appears to reside with equity income funds rather 
than ‘all company’ or small company funds.  At the negative end of the performance scale 
using net return 4F-alphas, UK and US results strongly reject the hypothesis that most poor 
performing funds are merely unlucky.   
As stated earlier, a simple count of all funds with ‘significant’ p-values ignores the 
possibility of some significant funds being “false discoveries”.   The ‘false discovery rate’ 
FDR - that is, the proportion of lucky funds among funds with positive significant 
(individual) alphas  is around  55% for US funds, so in fact only 23 (of the 52 “statistically 
significant”) top funds have genuine skill (i.e. about 2% of all US funds) - Barras, Scaillet 
and Wermers (2005). For the UK the FDR amongst winner funds (i.e. 0iα > ) is 58% so 
only 9 funds truly outperform (1.3% of all 675 funds) - Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and 
O’Sullivan (2007). The FDR amongst loser funds is much lower (in the region of 10%) and 
it is found that about 15-20% of all US and UK funds have genuinely poor performance.  
Thus for the US and UK there are a much higher proportion of false discoveries among the 
best funds than among the worst funds - so the standard method of simply counting the 
number of funds with “significant” test statistics can be far more misleading for “winners” 
than for “losers”.     
 
                                                 
8 Note that these results although they deal with the issue of order statistics, are still subject to Type-I and 
Type-II errors, so use of “genuine” and “skilled” should be interpreted in the usual way. Results are largely 
invariant to use of an conditional/unconditional 4F model, to the minimum number of monthly observations 
used (18 < < 120) and ordering funds by alpha or t-alpha.   minT
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3.3     Persistence 
 
It is important to assess whether there are ex-ante rules which can be used to choose funds 
which subsequently earn statistically and economically significant abnormal returns - in 
short whether there is persistence in fund performance. However, it is here that our caveat 
about data snooping bias comes to the fore.  There have been so many different trading rules 
that have been tried (mainly on one US data set - CRSP), such that some may appear 
successful even though this may be due to luck. 
Overall, studies of predictability on US mutual funds using statistical measures (e.g. 
correlation, regression or contingency tables), find evidence that poor performance persists 
for up to 3 years, while there is mixed evidence that winners repeat over periods in excess 
of one year (Grinblatt and Titman, 1992, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1994, Brown and 
Goetzmann, 1995, Elton, Gruber and Blake, 1996, and Carhart 1997, Teo and Woo 2001).  
Results on UK mutual funds are somewhat sparse but indicate there may be some short-run 
persistence while evidence for long-run persistence is rather weak (Leger 1997, Allen and 
Tan 1999, Lunde, Timmermann and Blake, 1999, Fletcher and Forbes 2002).  However, 
such statistical measures of persistence do not necessarily imply an exploitable trading 
strategy - an issue we take up next. 
Using the recursive portfolio approach of Carhart (1997) with the 4F model, recent US 
studies (e.g. Kosowski et al., 2006) have found some evidence of persistence by the top 
decile portfolio for a one-year rebalancing period and stronger evidence that worst funds 
persist.  The source of this persistence is most likely to be a manifestation of the momentum 
effect in stocks which are ‘accidentally held’ by funds, rather than funds actively choosing 
stocks with a high loading on the momentum factor.   
When we consider monthly or quarterly rebalancing and more sophisticated sorting 
rules for example, based on past forecast accuracy (Mamaysky, Spiegel and Zhang, 2004) 
or Bayesian approaches (e.g. Cohen, Coval and Pastor, 2005) or “active trades”, which 
mainly turn out to be favourable IPO allocations (Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng, 2006) - US 
winners persist, with a top decile portfolio net return alpha in excess of 2.5% p.a. and loser 
persistence for the bottom decile around minus 4% p.a. There are far fewer studies of 
persistence using UK data and generally these find that past winners do not persist but past 
losers do (Quigley and Sinquefield, 2000, Fletcher, 1997, and  Fletcher and Forbes, 2002). 
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4     Hedge Funds 
 
The four most popular hedge fund styles are long-short equity (31%), event-driven (20%), 
global macro (10%) and fixed-income arbitrage (8%).  Other key strategies include, event 
driven strategies (e.g. merger arbitrage\ risk arbitrage) and distress strategies/special 
situations (Tremont Asset Flows Report, 2nd quarter, 2005). These strategies are risky so the 
term ‘hedge fund’ is somewhat misleading.  However, the term hedge fund is not a 
complete misnomer since many hedge fund styles seek to take long-short positions to hedge 
out any risks on which they do not wish to “place bets”. 
The collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 with a loss of $4bn 
capital and intervention by the Federal Reserve Board signaled the possibility of systemic 
risk from hedge funds.  Because of the lack of transparency of hedge funds, regulators are 
becoming increasingly concerned about their activities. 
 
4.1     Databases 
 
Although data sources for the hedge fund universe are improving they are generally not as 
comprehensive and reliable as those for equity mutual funds - so databases often involve 
survivorship bias, back-fill bias (sometimes called “instant industry bias”) and selection 
bias, (due to the fact that many hedge funds do not report to any database). Because many 
hedge funds have only short histories this makes statistical inference all the more difficult 
and as noted above raises issues of the power of test and the possibility of false discoveries. 
Some hedge funds hold illiquid assets (e.g. emerging market or distressed bonds) which 
may be difficult to value, so reported returns may be subject to “smoothing” and may be 
somewhat inaccurate on a month-to-month basis. This smoothing gives rise to 
autocorrelation in returns which can create problems when measuring the performance of 
hedge funds (Getmansky, Lo and Makarov, 2004).  Of course, if hedge funds do hold large 
amounts of illiquid assets and they try to sell these assets in a crisis period (e.g. the Russian 
bond crisis of 1998) they may put additional downward pressure on prices, so the recorded 
prices might not reflect the “true” price they will be able to obtain.  Also note that some 
funds might be closed to new investors, so the recorded returns are only attainable by 
existing investors (Fung et al., 2006).  
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4.2     Performance 
 
You may remember that in one of the Superman films the character played by Richard 
Pryor had the idea of using the bank’s computer system to collect all the nickels floating 
around in cyberspace and crediting them to his account.  A partner of LTCM described 
hedge funds as making money by vacuuming up nickels (pennies) since they used arbitrage 
strategies – later, less charitable commentators described it as picking up nickels in front of 
a turbo-charged steam roller – because these arbitrage positions were highly leveraged (in 
LTCM’s case by around 22:1 on average over June 1994-August 1997). 
Let’s have a look at some broad based statistics using the (value weighted) Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund index.  Between 1994 and the middle of 2006 the buy-and-
hold return on the hedge fund index was an average of 10.8 % p.a. (net of performance fees 
and expenses) with standard deviation of 7.8% p.a., compared with 10.3% average return 
for the S&P500 and standard deviation much higher at 14.5%.  So the Sharpe ratio of the 
hedge fund is around twice that of the S&P 500 - one immediate question here is whether 
the standard deviation is a good measure of risk, particularly for hedge funds with serially 
correlated returns.   
It is worth noting at the outset that trying to determine whether hedge funds “beat the 
market” is much more difficult than for mutual funds, which is not itself devoid of 
problems.  This is because 
  
• hedge fund databases may be incomplete 
• adjusting returns for the risks inherent in hedge fund strategies is complex (and 
controversial) in part due to negative skewness and excess kurtosis in returns.  
• returns from some illiquid strategies are difficult to correctly value 
• we have a relatively short time span of data. 
 
 But here is some evidence on the matter. First, using over 3,000 hedge funds between 
January 1999 to March 2004, Ibbotson and Chen (2005) find that the average (net return) 
alpha is 3.7% p.a., which is much higher than the average for mutual funds which is around 
minus 1-2% p.a. The problem of assessing hedge fund performance on historic data is the 
possibility that hedge funds look relatively risk free (in terms of volatility) but are prone to 
very large losses (and possible insolvency) - as with Aramanth in 2006 and more 
controversially LTCM in 1998.  Hedge funds might be acting very much like an insurance 
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company which sells catastrophe insurance (e.g. insurance against earthquakes).  While 
there are no earthquakes the insurance company looks good. It pockets the premiums, has 
no claims, profits are high and not volatile – until that is, the rare event occurs (Lo, 2001). 
Until recently there has not been a great deal of work on individual hedge fund 
performance because of a lack of reliable data.  Early studies show that hedge funds have a 
high rate of attrition (Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1999) and they give conflicting 
results on the risk adjusted performance of hedge funds and persistence in hedge fund 
returns. See, inter alia, Fung and Hsieh (1997) who find negative alphas, while evidence of 
a positive risk adjusted performance and some persistence in returns is noted by Agarwal 
and Naik (2000) - although the latter is possibly due to the ‘style’ adopted by the hedge 
fund rather than genuine manager skills (Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1999, and 
Brown, Goetzmann and Park, 2001).   
 
4.3     Fund Styles 
 
What about the performance of particular fund styles. A recent study by Capocci and 
Hubner (2004) uses a multifactor model on a large database of over 2,700 hedge funds 
(including 801 ‘dead funds’) concentrating mainly on the more recent (and accurate) 
monthly returns over the bull market period of 1994-2000.  Funds are divided into around 
20 style categories (e.g. long-short, emerging markets etc.).  Overall there are around 25-
30% of funds within any style category that have positive and statistically significant 
alphas, with around 5-10% having negative alphas and the majority of funds (i.e. around 
60%) having zero alphas.9  The market betas of the hedge funds are lower than those for 
mutual funds (at around 0.3-0.6) and for almost all funds, the coefficient on the (Small 
Minus Big) SMB factor is statistically significant.  A subset of the funds also have a 
significant coefficient on the emerging bond return but only about 1/3 of funds show 
evidence of a statistically significant (High Minus Low) HML factor and about 15% of 
funds have a significant momentum factor.  The R-squared for these multifactor regressions 
are mostly in the range 0.65-0.90.  Hence, most hedge funds appear to have exposure to 
small cap stocks, while a smaller proportion are also exposed to emerging market bonds and 
momentum stocks.  Unfortunately in only a few cases (i.e. long-short, convertible arbitrage, 
non-classified) do the positive alphas over the whole period 1994-2000, remain positive 
 
9 Of course as noted above, some of these will be false discoveries. 
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over sub-periods.  The recent study by Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007) find that in a sample 
of over 2,700 funds (January 1994-December 2002) all of the individual funds in the top 
10% of hedge funds ranked by t-alpha have highly statistically significant large positive 
(seven-factor) ex-post alphas - while all of the funds in the bottom 10% have negative 
alphas but these are due to bad luck rather than ‘bad skill’.   
So, there is evidence that a randomly selected hedge fund will have a negative or zero 
alpha but the best hedge funds have positive and statistically significant alphas which 
exceed those for the top mutual funds.  Although here one should not forget the rather acute 
problems in assessing risk-adjusted hedge fund performance (these are less severe when 
looking at mutual funds).  
 
4.4     Persistence 
 
What happens when we assess persistence by forming explicit portfolios of past winners 
and tracking their future performance?  Short-term persistence, at three month horizons, in 
hedge fund raw returns has been found in early studies but such persistence does not occur 
at longer horizons (e.g.  Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1999, Agarwal and Niak, 2000,  
and Liang, 2000).  Also note that Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) argue that short-term 
persistence may be due to illiquidity in returns which gives rise to “return smoothing” and 
apparent persistence in returns.  Capocci and Hubner (2004) sort hedge funds into deciles 
based on their past 1-year returns and they find that there is no persistence in performance 
for the top and bottom deciles.  In contrast, Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007), with annual 
rebalancing and ranking hedge funds based on their past “t-alpha”, find that all decile sorted 
portfolios exhibit statistically significant forward looking alphas of between 4% and 6% p.a. 
over January 1994-December 2002. Clearly, ‘winner persistence’ is much stronger 
statistically and economically in hedge funds compared with (US or UK) equity mutual 
funds.     
 
4.5     The Future of Hedge Funds 
 
As hedge funds attract more institutional investors with fiduciary duties they will have to 
become more transparent about their trades and risk positions and perhaps to adopt specific 
benchmarks (e.g. a specific hedge fund index).  Even now some fund-of-funds obtain 
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detailed and frequent information (sometimes daily) on hedge fund positions and risk 
measures.  Also having to stay reasonably close to a benchmark may lead to less investment 
in highly specialized strategies for fear of tracking error or earning less than the benchmark 
- which would probably entail substantial outflows of funds.  Mutual funds are also gaining 
more regulatory freedom to invest in derivatives so there is some convergence between the 
two sectors.  There are also new products on the market which claim to successfully track 
the behavior of hedge fund indices (i.e. their average returns, volatility, skewness etc.)  by 
using “mechanical” trading strategies (using highly liquid futures and options) that can be 
programmed with real time prices. These replication funds have much lower fees than fund-
of-funds or a portfolio of individual hedge funds, so these may capture some of the capital 
which currently flows into the traditional hedge fund sector - why pay high management 
fees for something you can replicate at lower cost. (Goldman Sachs produced one of the 
first hedge fund replication portfolios in 2006 - see also Kat and Palaro, 2005).  So 
convergence between mutual and hedge funds seems likely with a continuum of different 
types of fund. 
Precisely which hedge funds to regulate will become more difficult as this convergence 
takes place.  Regulation is likely to be based on rules about disclosure - with “hedge funds” 
who do not agree to disclosure requirements remaining in the unregulated sector.  Whether 
this makes the markets more volatile is subject to much debate.  Hedge funds may suffer 
from liquidity risk - they have highly levered positions and their risk strategy often depends 
on being able to get out of these positions with speed and little price impact.  If liquidity is 
thin and banks begin to call in their loans because of fear of a collapse in the hedge fund and 
if there are many banks in this position (due to concentration risk), then hedge funds may in 
part contribute to systemic risk in financial markets.  Clearly this was the view taken by the 
Federal Reserve in August 1998 over LTCM which had losses exceeding its capital of 
around $4bn.  In addition, banks who are providers of lines of credit (i.e. bank loans for 
leveraged transactions) may also provide stock lending to funds (for short sales) and may 
also be counterparties to OTC derivative trades by hedge funds.  Of course, these “facts” are 
as much an argument for the sensible regulation of the financial intermediary’s credit risk as 
it is for the regulation of hedge funds themselves.  In contrast to LTCM the $6bn losses of 
Amaranth in September 2006 seemed to cause minimum impact on markets and financial 
institutions. 
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5     Conclusions 
 
In terms of ex-post performance recent US and UK studies find around 2-10% of funds in 
the extreme right tail have positive net return alphas and at least 20% of funds spread 
throughout the right tail have poor performance (Barras, Scaillet and Wermers, 2005, 
Kosowski et al., 2006, Kosowski, Naik and Teo, 2007, and Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and 
O’Sullivan, 2008).  US data reveal that the top performers are in growth and aggressive 
growth styles, while in the UK, skilled funds tend to be in the income style rather than in 
growth or small cap funds.   
What about hedge fund performance?  This poses major data and modelling problems 
(Fung et al., 2006). The top hedge funds appear to have higher risk adjusted returns than 
mutual funds and past winner funds exhibit short term persistence. One can only suggest 
caution, both in terms of “picking winners” and also when adding hedge funds to an 
existing market portfolio in order to improve diversification.  The lack of transparency and 
difficulty in assessing risk makes investment in hedge funds rather dangerous.   
Hedge funds currently widen the area of choice for at least some sophisticated investors, 
whereas mutual funds widen the set of investments open to somewhat less sophisticated 
investors.  These are two different clienteles and from an investor protection viewpoint 
there is no reason why the two cannot co-exist, in the same way that private equity also 
provides a different type of investment which caters to a different clientele.  However, it is 
important that investors, particularly retail investors are informed in an unbiased way about 
the risk-return profiles of different investments. Given the massive funds available for 
“advertising” their funds and maybe an incentive for being “economical with the truth”, 
there is a prima facie case for government working via truly independent organizations 
which have sufficient resources, to provide impartial information on risk-return profiles of 
funds.10
 
10 OECD (2005) provides a survey of nascent programmes in developing financial education in member states. 
See also Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan (2005).   
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